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DISQUALIFYING A DISTRICT ATTORNEY WHEN A
GOVERNMENT WITNESS WAS ONCE THE DISTRICT

ATTORNEY'S CLIENT:
THE LAW BETWEEN THE COURTS AND THE STATE
ELI WALD

t

INTRODUCTION

Should a district attorney be disqualified from a criminal case if a
prosecution witness is a former client of the district attorney?1 Although
there has been significant academic, legislative and judicial attention to
disqualification of district attorneys in general,2 and to disqualification of
district attorneys who represented the defendant in particular, 3 a prosecut Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; B.A., TelAviv University; LL.B., Tel-Aviv University; LL.M., Harvard Law School (waived); S.J.D., Harvard Law School. I thank Arthur Best, Erik Lemmon and Kris Miccio for their useful comments and
Bryce llvonen and University of Denver Sturm College of Law research librarian Diane Burkhardt
for their research assistance. This article explores grounds for disqualification of district attorneys,
among them personal and financial conflicts of interest. It thus seems appropriate to disclose my
own "interest" in the subject matter addressed in this article: I served as a paid expert witness in
People v. Lincoln, a case the article explores in detail and testified for the defense arguing that Colorado law allows in some circumstances for the disqualification of a district attorney who represented
a former-client-turned-witness for the government. On the duty to disclose possible conflicts or
factors potentially effecting scholarship, see Graham Brown, Should Law Professors Practice What
They Teach? 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 316 (2001); Richard Lippitt, Intellectual Honesty, Industry and
Interest Sponsored Professional Works, and Full Disclosure: Is the Viewpoint Earning the Money,
or Is the Money Earning the Viewpoint? 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1075 (2001); see also William Simon,
The Marketfor Bad Legal Advice: Academic ProfessionalResponsibility Consulting as an Example,
(Columbia Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper Number 07-158,
2007), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract-1025984.
I. Issues of first impression blur the line between positive (what the law is) and normative
(what the law should be). See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1231-32 (1987) (summarizing and challenging the
positive-normative dichotomy). Because disqualification of district attorneys who represented
former-clients-turned-witnesses for the government is an issue of first impression not previously
decided, positive law is silent in the sense that it does not clearly allow nor disallow such disqualifications. The question of whether the law should allow for disqualification of district attorneys under
such circumstances thus becomes a normative one. See Wallace D. Loh, Book Review, In Quest of
Brown 's Promise: Social Research and Social Values in School Desegregation, 58 WASH. L. REV.
129, 165 (1982) (arguing that first impression cases call upon the courts to engage in a jurisprudence
of discretion and decide both applicable law and the facts).
See, e.g., Abby L. Dennis, Note, Refining in the Minister of Justice: ProsecutorialOver2.
sight and the Superseder Power, 57 Duke L. J. 131 (2007). See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS,
ARBITRARY JUSTICE - THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 123-161 (2007); Bennett L.
Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393 (1992) (observing that prosecutors are
greatly insulated from judicial control over their conduct); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between
ProsecutorialMisconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006
WiSC. L. REV. 399, 425-27; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness ofFederalProsecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000).
3. Allan L. Schwartz & Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Disqualificationof Prosecuting
Attorney in State Criminal Case on Account of Relationship with Accused, 42 A.L.R. 5th 581, II.A.
(1996); What Circumstances Justify Disqualificationof Prosecutorin Federal Criminal Case, 110
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tor's disqualification when a former client becomes a government witness has received no academic attention, has not been addressed by statutes, and has not been decided by courts. 4 Studying the grounds for disqualification of district attorneys whose former clients become government witnesses sheds light on the complex battle between the judiciary
and the state for authority and control over the Office of the District Attorney and the criminal justice system. 5
In this conflict, the judiciary invokes its inherent powers to disqualify district attorneys and the state responds by asserting executive powers
and promulgating disqualification statutes asserting exclusive authority.
Recognizing the state's immense power and inherent advantage over
defendants, the criminal justice system incorporates safeguards, often by
means of broad judicial interpretation, to protect the right of the accused
to a fair trial.6 In the context of disqualification of district attorneys, the
judiciary's role in expanding and protecting defendants' rights against
the state suggests a sympathetic approach towards motions to disqualify
district attorneys.7 However, to further its interest in effective pursuit of
law and order, the state may seek to protect the Office of the District
Attorney from undue interference. This motivation may lead to a general
approach disfavoring disqualification motions and to displeasure with the
exercise of judicial inherent powers to disqualify district attorneys.
The issue of disqualification of district attorneys when a former client becomes a government witness thus involves more than balancing the
state's interests in administering law and order via the Office of the District Attorney against the interests of defendants and former-clientsA.L.R. FED. 523, 1.-II. (1992); 63C AM. JUR. 2d Prosecuting Attorneys §§ 26-28, 48 (2007) [hereinafter Circumstances].
4.
The question did come up as an issue of first impression before a Colorado trial court in
the spring of 2007 in the matter of People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274, 1276 (Colo. 2007). The trial
court answered the question in the affirmative. Id. The state of the law, however, is unclear because
the Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded without directly addressing the issue. Id. at
1282. For a review of the power struggle between the courts and the state over the regulation of the
Office of the District Attorney, see generally BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT vi (2d ed. 2005) (lamenting the passivity of the judiciary in overseeing prosecutorial power).
5.
In the battle for control over the District Attorney's Office the "state" is represented by
both the executive branch and the legislative branch, working together to curb the power of the
judiciary and its exercise of inherent powers. To be sure, I do assert this alliance between the executive and legislative branches generally in the context of the criminal justice system, only that the two
branches do cooperate in asserting authority over the Office of the District Attorney vis-A-vis the
judiciary.
6.
The role of the judiciary in safeguarding the rights of the criminal defendant given the
power of the state over the accused has been well documented. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Book
Review, Why Do You Think They Call It CapitalPunishment? Reading the Killing State, 36 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 783, 795 (2002) (exploring "examples of the Supreme Court expanding the rights of
criminal defendants at the expense of state power"); Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment
and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1263 (1998) (examining the role
of the defense attorney in limiting "the arbitrary exercise of coercive state power by safeguarding the
defendant's entitlement to basic ... rights").
7.
For example, disqualification of a district attorney may be ordered as a remedy for prosecutorial misconduct. See Circumstances,supra note 2, at § 10[a].

2007]

DISQUALIFYING A DISTRICT ATTORNEY

turned-witnesses. It provides an opportunity to explore how law is created in the shadow of, and as the result of, the battle between the courts
and the state and to appreciate the consequences for parties caught in the
crossfire.
Part I of this article explores the doctrine of inherent powers, its use
by the judiciary to disqualify district attorneys in the shadow of its relationship with the executive branch, and legislative attempts to abrogate it
by means of promulgating disqualification statutes asserting exclusive
authority over the regulation of the District Attorney's Office. It asserts
that such exclusive provisions are unconstitutional because they violate
the separation of powers doctrine and that courts have the inherent power
to disqualify a district attorney beyond the authority granted to them by
statute. Finally, Part I examines the circumstances under which courts
should exercise their inherent power and disqualify a district attorney
whose former client is a government witness.
Part II studies disqualification statutes, argues that such statutes
should generally be read to allow for the disqualification of a district
attorney who represented former-clients-turned-witnesses for the government, and explores the circumstances under which such disqualification would be appropriate. Part III analyzes a recent Colorado case to
illustrate that lack of resolution of the issue of disqualification of district
attorneys whose former clients become government witnesses has unfortunate consequences for those witnesses, for defendants and for the integrity of the judicial process.
I. COURTS' INHERENT POWER TO DISQUALIFY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS

A. Courts 'Inherent Powers - a Doctrine of "Happy Indeterminacy"?
The inherent powers doctrine is a long-established, 8 cumulative, 9
expansive,1 ° judicial assertion of possessing the exclusive authority to
regulate the practice of law. Analytically, the doctrine consists of two
8. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, § 2.2.3, at 27 n.45 (1986) (The first
American case commonly cited for asserting the inherent powers doctrine was In re Mosness, 39
Wis. 509 (1876)); see also Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate the
PracticeofLaw: An HistoricalAnalysis,32 Buff. L. Rev. 525,536 (1983).
9. See id §2.2.1 at23.
10.
Some of the powers claimed by various jurisdictions include the following:
[T]he power to promulgate an official lawyer's code; to admit lawyers to practice under
specified conditions and to disbar or otherwise discipline admitted lawyers; to define the
unauthorized practice of law and to fashion remedies to banish nonlawyers from the defined realms of exclusive lawyer practice, even when the assertedly unauthorized practice
has nothing to do with court proceedings; to construct an integrated bar of which all lawyers must be members in good standing in order to continue practicing law; to levy an assessment that every lawyer must pay toward support of the court's activities in regulating
the legal profession; and to regulate the conduct of judges and to issue and enforce compliance with the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Id. § 2.2.2 at 24-5; see also Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practiceof
Law--A ProposedDelineation,60 Minn. L. Rev. 783, 785 (1976) [hereinafter Delineation].
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steps. First, courts claim that various "'implied,' 'essential,' 'incidental'
or 'inherent""' powers are necessary to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.' 2 Second, courts invoke the constitutional law separation
of powers doctrine to protect their self-proclaimed inherent powers. The
separation of powers doctrine, recognized under federal and state law,
generally empowers each governmental branch-legislative, executive,
and judicial 3-to act within its prescribed sphere, and states that "no
branch may attempt to exercise a power [bestowed] upon [another]
branch."' 4 Applying the separation of powers doctrine, courts have asserted that any attempt by either the executive or the legislative branch to
inherent power to regulate the practice of law
encroach upon the courts'
15
unconstitutional.
was
Over time, the regulation of the practice of law pursuant to the
courts' inherent powers has been recognized as a traditional judicial
function. 6 However, the scope of the doctrine and its application are
unclear.' 7 Indeed, while courts have clearly established their power to
regulate the practice of law, their claim to have this power exclusively
and the manner in which courts exercise it in particular instances have
been greatly challenged. Interestingly, this state of uncertainty is intentional: courts have generally avoided comprehensively addressing all the
competing considerations embedded in inherent powers generally and
have instead
focused "on the individual inherent power involved in each
18
,

case."

Specifically, in Link v. Wabash19 the Court established the framework for courts' acquiescence to statutory limitations on their inherent
powers, holding that a statute will not abrogate an inherent power of the
court absent clear legislative intent.20 In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,21 the
Henry M. Dowling, The InherentPower of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A. J. 635, 636 (1935).
11.
12.
See Comm. on Legal Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v. lkner, 438 S.E.2d 613, 617 (W. Va.
1993) (quoting In re Grubb, 417 S.E.2d 919, 922 (W. Va. 1992) (Generally, courts "have an inherent
responsibility under... general supervisory powers to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and to
maintain the public confidence in our court system.")). Courts possess the power to regulate the
practice of law in order to protect the public and to uphold the public confidence in attorney reliability and integrity. Id at 616; see also Delineation, supranote 10, at 785-86.
13.
Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of the InherentPowers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 1, 5 (1989).
14.
WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 2.2.3 at 27.
15.
Id.; see also Alpert, supra note 8, at 525 ("With but few exceptions, the courts have determined that the doctrine of the separation of powers limits or even precludes legislative regulation
of this vital profession."); Delineation,supra note 10, at 785-86.
16.
Id.; see also Delineation, supra note 10, at 784 ("Judicial regulation of the legal profession has predominated for many years.").
17.
See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powersof FederalCourts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 738 (2001) (asserting that the fundamental questions of the
source and scope of courts' inherent powers have never been satisfactorily addressed).
18.
Id.at 739.
370 U.S. 626 (1962).
19.
Id.at 630-31.
20.
501 U.S. 32 (1991).
21.
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Court added that authority granted under a statute only applies to the
circumstances specified within it, whereas the inherent powers of the
court extend to a full range of circumstances, 22 concluding that even with
the grant of statutory power, "inherent power[s] ...continue to exist to
fill in the interstices. 23 Some have celebrated this uncertain state of
24
affairs as one of a "constitutional artistry" and "happy indeterminacy,,
arguing that courts have been declining to decide the broader issues embedded in inherent powers, acquiescing to legislation concerning courts'
powers and leaving open a zone of undefined judicial discretion in order
to avoid direct inter-branch confrontations.2 5 Others, however, have
critically argued that courts refuse to decide the greater issues because
the case-by-case approach allows them to stretch the narrow terms "implied," "essential," "incidental," and "necessary" to rationalize a wide
range of actions
that are in fact not essential to their exercise of judicial
26
authority.

In any event, and regardless of competing positions regarding the
desirability of this state of affairs, the inherent powers doctrine is in disarray with no comprehensive theory regarding its scope and application.
On the one hand courts routinely assert the possession of inherent powers
and invoke them regularly; and on the other hand courts frequently admonish that such powers must be exercised cautiously, 27 and acquiesce to
legislation controlling and restricting their inherent powers. 28 The question becomes, therefore, not whether courts possess inherent powers but
whether courts should exercise their inherent powers in a particular instance.29
22.
Id.at 46.
23.
Id.
24.
Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.
J. 929,971 (1996).
25.
Id.at 967-71; see also Pushaw, supra note 17, at 782-83.
26.
Pushaw, supra note 17, at 738.
27.
See Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996) ("Principles of deference counsel
restraint in resorting to inherent powers .... ).
28.
See, e.g., State v. Hoegh, 632 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2001) ("We have recognized that
some inherent powers may be controlled or restricted by statute. Some inherent powers may even be
overridden by statute. Other inherent powers may be so fundamental to the operation of a court that
any attempt by the legislature to restrict or divest the court of the power could violate the separation
of powers doctrine. (citations omitted)); see also Carrington, supranote 24, at 967-71.
29.
Michael L. Buenger, Of Money andJudicialIndependence: Can Inherent Powers Protect
State Courts in Tough Fiscal Times? 92 KY. L.J. 979, 1049 (2004) ("The question, therefore, is not
whether court can exercise this [inherent] power, but rather when they should do so." (alteration in
original)). Colorado case law illustrates the indeterminacy: on the one hand, the inherent powers
doctrine has been recognized consistently and repeatedly by the Colorado Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953, 956 (Colo. 1984) ("[The inherent powers of the judiciary
include] '[a]ll powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence, and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective.
These powers are inherent in the sense that they exist because the court exists; the court is, therefore
it has the powers reasonably required to act as an efficient court."' (quoting Jim Carrigan, Inherent
Powers andFinance, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 22) (alteration in original)). On the other hand, the
court has admonished the strict and limited use of inherent powers. See, e.g., In re Estate of Myers,
130 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Colo. 2006).
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B. Inherent Powers andDisqualificationof DistrictAttorneys
The expansive inherent powers doctrine generally encompasses the

power to disqualify attorneys. 30 Courts have routinely justified this power on the ground that attorneys are officers of the court, 1 and as such,
their conduct directly affects the integrity, efficiency, and public perception of the judiciary.32 For example, the Colorado Supreme Court has
the power to disqualify attorneys to
held that inherent powers include
33
preserve the court's integrity.

Courts' inherent powers also include, more specifically, the power
to disqualify prosecuting attorneys.34 That said, courts have been quite
reluctant to exercise their power to disqualify district attorneys and quick
to follow the Link and Chambers framework acquiescing to statutes limiting their exercise of inherent power. Reasoning that the function of
prosecuting criminal cases has historically been within the province of

30.
See Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Inc. Viii. of Valley Stream, 409 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir.
2005) ("The authority of federal courts to disqualify attorneys derives from their inherent power to
"preserve the integrity of the adversary process' (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241,
1246 (2d Cir.1979)); Talecris Biotherapeutics, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513
(D. Del. 2007) (the court has the power to govern conduct of any attorney appearing before itincluding disqualification); Conley v. Chaffinch, 431 F. Supp. 2d 494, 496 (D. Del. 2006) (the
court's inherent power to govern attorneys "appearing before it" includes disqualification as a regulatory measure); Roush v. Seagate Technology, LLC, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 275, 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
(courts possess inherent power to disqualify attorneys in order to further justice and control officers
of the court); Oaks Management Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 561, 567 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (explaining Judge's authority to disqualify attorneys originates from courts' inherent power to
further justice and control over those who appear before it).
31.
See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) (upon acceptance as a member of
the bar, "[h]e became an officer of the court" (quoting Justice Cardozo in People ex rel. Karlin v.
Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71 (N.Y. 1928))); see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the
Court, 42 VAND. L. REv. 39 (1989) (examining the dubious meaning of officer of the court with
regard to the attorney's roles and responsibilities in contemporary practice realities).
32.
Delineation, supra note 10, at 785; Dowling, supra note 11, at 639 ("The court is regu"
larly engaged in administering correct principles of justice and of fair dealing among men .
Consequently, if an attorney disregards the principles of justice, then the court "has the right to
discipline the unworthy member, and exclude those who, in contempt of the tribunal, seek to practice
law before it without proper admission, or otherwise disparage the court's dignity.").
33.
E.g., Myers, 130 P.3d at 1025. ("[C]ourts have the inherent power to ensure both the
reality and appearance of integrity and fairness in proceedings before them; and to that end, they
necessarily retain the discretion to disqualify attorneys from further representation."). Consistent
with the "happy indeterminacy" approach, immediately following its affirmation of the inherent
power to disqualify attorneys the court admonished its careful use. Id.; see also People v. Witty, 36
P.3d 69, 73 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
34.
Rhodes v. Miller, 437 N.E.2d 978, 979-80 (Ind. 1982) ("[A] trial judge does have the
authority, and, in fact, the responsibility, to find that a prosecuting attorney, and/or members of his
staff, should be disqualified if he finds facts to be true with reference to such disqualification and to
then appoint a special prosecuting attorney to try the cause"); Lux v. Commonwealth of Virginia,
484 S.E.2d 145, 149 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) ("In order to protect prosecutorial impartiality, a trial court
has the power to disqualify a Commonwealth's attorney from proceeding with a particular criminal
prosecution if the trial court determines that the Commonwealth's attorney has an interest pertinent
to a defendant's case that may conflict with the Commonwealth's attorney's official duties"); see
also State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 313 (Tenn. 2000); Cole v. State, 2 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1999); Brown v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 504 S.E.2d 399, 402 (Va. Ct. App. 1998); State
v. Copeland, 928 S.W.2d 828, 840 (Mo, 1996).
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the executive branch, 35 and that the legislative and executive branches
maintain a strong interest in the appointment of and the exercise of authority over district attorneys, courts have concluded that the interest in
the appointment and disqualification of district attorneys is and should be
shared by all branches of government.36
Recent amendments to disqualification statutes, however, seem to
have pushed the envelope and crossed the line from sharing authority
over the regulation of district attorneys to usurping it. For example, it
seems that the Colorado legislature has attempted to abrogate the courts'
inherent power to disqualify a district attorney. Colorado Revised Statute section 20-1-107 purports to specify the "only" grounds for which a
district attorney may be disqualified.37
The statute itself gives ample support for the preemption intent of
the Colorado legislature. First, subsection 20-1-107(2) states: "A district
attorney may only be disqualified in a particular case. . ." and goes on to
specify three grounds for disqualification. "Only" is explicitly exclusive
and renders Chambers meaningless: the authority granted by the Colorado statute does not apply to certain circumstances, rather it purports to
exhaustively define all the circumstances permitting disqualification of
district attorneys. Further, the exclusive language of the statute makes it
clear that the legislature envisions no "interstices" for the courts to fill in.
Second, subsection 20-1-107(1) states in relevant part: "The general assembly finds that ... [it has] the exclusive authority to prescribe the duties of the office of the district attorney .... ." The exclusivity language
suggests that courts do not have authority over the duties of the district
attorney and arguably no authority to disqualify a district attorney.
Third, subsection 20-1-107(2) states that a disqualification motion shall
not be granted unless a court finds one of the three grounds specified in
the subsection, once again lending support for the proposition that a court
cannot grant a motion and disqualify a district attorney for reasons other
than the ones enumerated in the statute. It further restricts the ability of
the courts to disqualify a district attorney by mandating an automatic stay
of a disqualification order pending a mandatory interlocutory appeal before the Colorado Supreme Court.38

35.
See United States v. Jacobo-Zavala, 241 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2001). State v. Hoegh,
632 N.W.2d 885, 889-90 (Iowa 2001) (finding that a statute granting the power of appointment of a
special prosecutor to the county board of supervisors, while removing a power from the courts and
vesting it in the legislature, did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because the legislature
legitimately shared an interest in and responsibility for the regulation of special prosecutors).
36. Hoegh, 632 N.W.2d at 889-90 (finding that a statute granting the power of appointment of
a special prosecutor to the county board of supervisors, while removing a power from the courts and
vesting it in the legislature, did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because the legislature
legitimately shared an interest in and responsibility for the regulation of special prosecutors).
37. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-107 (West 2007).
38. Arguably, by promulgating an open-ended standard of disqualification which calls for
judicial interpretation, see infra Part 1I,the legislature left courts ample room in which to exercise
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Furthermore, the legislative history suggests that the Colorado legislature amended the statute in 2002 in response to two 2001 decisions. In
City and County of Denver v. County Court,39 the Colorado Court of
Appeals held that appearance of impropriety alone justifies disqualification of city attorney's office, despite the fact that the term "appearance of
impropriety" no longer appeared in a relevant authorizing statute; and in
People v. Palomo,4 ° the Colorado Supreme Court held that appearance of
impropriety can be the basis for disqualification of the District Attorney's Office.4 ' Both cases found support for the appearance of impropriety as a ground for disqualification in the courts' inherent powers. 42 It
seems clear that the Colorado legislature intended to override these decisions.43 Indeed, the Colorado Supreme Court has found explicitly that
of impropriety' as a basis for
the revised statute "eliminates 'appearance
' 4
disqualification of district attorneys. "
A narrow interpretation of the statute, according to which it did not
intend to abrogate inherent powers but only meant to disallow the appearance of impropriety as an independent ground disqualification is
implausible. First, the legislature could have explicitly disallowed the
appearance of impropriety as a ground for disqualification rather than
specify the "only" grounds, omitting the appearance of impropriety.
Second, the "appearance of impropriety" is, and means, the courts' invocation of inherent powers.4 5 That is, disallowing the appearance of impropriety is tantamount to challenging the courts' inherent power to disqualify a district attorney.
The Colorado legislature is not alone in trying to restrict the courts'
inherent power to disqualify district attorneys. Following the California
power and discretion. The straightforward language of the statute and the legislative history, however, contradict this construction and clarify that the legislature intended to exercise exclusive authority over disqualification of district attorneys.
39. 37 P.3d 453 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
40. 31 P.3d 879 (Colo. 2001).
41.
Id.at 882; see also People v. County Court, 854 P.2d 1341 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that appearance of impropriety is not only a proper ground for disqualification of a district attorney,
it is also a compelling basis for such action).
42.

Palomo, 31 P.3d 879; People v. County Court, 37 P.3d at 456 ("Whether an attorney

should be disqualified is a matter within the discretion of the court").
43.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-107 (West 2007).
People v. Chavez, 139 P.3d. 649, 653 (Colo. 2006); People ex rel. N.R., 139 P.3d 671, 675
44.
(Colo. 2006) ("We conclude that, in using the word 'only' and defining with specificity the circum-

stances under which disqualification is proper, the amended version of section 20-1-107 eliminates
'appearance of impropriety' as a basis for disqualification."); People v. Manzanares, 139 P.3d 655,
658 (Colo. 2006); In re E.L.T., 139 P.3d 685, 687 (Colo. 2006). It is possible to assert that while the

legislature eliminated the appearance of impropriety as an independent ground for disqualification,
the appearance of impropriety nevertheless makes a backdoor reentry into the statute because it can
be considered as part of "special circumstances" under the statute. Justice Bender explicitly rejects
this approach, however, because he believes that the appearance of impropriety is tantamount to
courts' inherent powers which exist outside of and in spite of a disqualification statute. N.R., 139
P.3d at 682 (Bender, J., dissenting).
45.
N.R., 139 P.3d at 682 (Bender, J., dissenting) ("The phrase 'appearance of impropriety'
establishes a nebulous standard, that broadly describes the court's inherent power.").
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Supreme Court decision in People v. Superior Court (Greer),46 the legislature promulgated section 1424 of the California Penal Code, which
states in relevant part: "The motion may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely
that the defendant would receive a fair trial (emphasis added). ' 47 In
other words, the California legislature seems to have stated the only
ground for disqualification of a district attorney because pursuant to the
statute a court may not grant a motion to disqualify unless it finds that
defendant has met the statutory standard for disqualification.48
To the extent they purport to usurp the inherent power of the courts
to disqualify a district attorney, both the Colorado and California statutes
violate the separation of powers doctrine and are unconstitutional. Exploring the interplay between the judiciary's inherent power and the
separation of powers doctrine, Wolfram argues that the inherent powers
doctrine consists of two separate aspects-the "affirmative aspect" and
the "negative aspect., 49 Courts invoke the affirmative aspect when they
hold that they have the inherent authority to regulate attorneys when
statutes are silent on the issue.50 The negative aspect, conversely, arises
when courts hold legislative or administrative laws unconstitutional because either the legislative or the executive branch violated the separation of powers doctrine by attempting to regulate attorneys and the practice of law. 5 1 The negative aspect of the inherent powers doctrine asserts
that the courts, and only the courts, may regulate attorneys (emphasis
added). 52 The statutes in Colorado and California clearly violate the
negative aspect of the inherent powers doctrine. The statutes do not purport to share authority over the disqualification of district attorneys,

46.
561 P.2d 1164 (1977).
47.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1424(a)(1) (Deering 2007).
48.
In People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 317 (Cal. 1996), the California Supreme Court concluded that the statute precluded the use of the appearance of impropriety standard as an independent
ground for recusal, holding that the critical analysis in determining the existence of a conflict instead
is that "the likelihood that the defendant will not receive a fair trial-must be real, not merely apparent, and must rise to the level of a likelihood of unfairness." Importantly, because the statute did not
purport to exercise exclusive authority over the office of the district attorney, the California Supreme
Court did not consider whether the legislature's preclusion of the appearance of impropriety as an
independent ground interferes with the court's inherent power to disqualify the office of the district
attorney. Instead, it merely interpreted the statute and presumably found it consistent with its inherent power and therefore not in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
49.
Wolfram, supra note 13, at 4.
50. Id. Support for the affirmative aspect of the inherent powers doctrine is found in state
constitutions. The language tends to grant the judiciary general power over judicial functions, id. at
5, and often resembles a variation of the following: "The judicial power shall be vested in courts
consisting of a supreme court and such other courts of inferior jurisdictions as the legislature may
establish." Id. Pursuant to the affirmative aspect of the inherent powers doctrine state supreme
courts regulate attorneys in all fifty states. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of
Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts,Legislatures,or the Market?,
37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1171 (2003).
51.
Wolfram, supra note 13, at 7.
52.
WOLFRAM, supranote 8, § 2.2 at 24.
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rather, they vest exclusive authority in the legislature to promulgate the
grounds for disqualification.
The Supreme Courts of Colorado and California, however, have ignored the unconstitutionality of the disqualification statutes. The Supreme Court of California, in People v. Conner,5 3 acknowledged that the
legislature promulgated section 1424 in order to change the disqualification standard the Court announced in Greer, yet accepted and construed
the statute without even commenting on the constitutionality issue.
Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court in People ex rel. N.R.,54 quoted
the legislative declaration of "exclusive authority," noted that such a
declaration contradicted the century long doctrine that courts have the
inherent power to disqualify a district attorney beyond the authority
granted to them by statute, cited at length numerous cases in support of
courts' inherent power but concluded that: "it is unnecessary in this case
to decide whether the legislature's claim of exclusive authority 'to prescribe the duties of the office of the district attorney' in the context of
disqualification conflicts with the judiciary's inherent authority 'to protect its dignity, independence, and integrity."' 5 5 Presumably the court
did not need to decide the issue because the trial court did not explicitly
invoke its inherent powers to disqualify the district attorney.
In his dissent, Justice Bender strongly disagreed.5 6 Finding that the
trial court acted within its inherent powers, Justice Bender reasoned that
"by its use of the adverb 'only,"' the statute "narrows the traditional and
time-honored inherent power of the courts and thus violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 57 Justice Bender rejected the
majority's assertion that addressing the declaration of exclusivity is unnecessary, pointing out that by ignoring it the majority "effectively concludes that the disqualification statute does in fact present an exhaustive
list of circumstances under which a trial court may disqualify a district
attorney." 58 He concluded that "the statute's claim to set forth such an

53.
666 P.2d 5, 8 (Cal. 1983).
139 P.3d 671 (Colo. 2006).
54.
55.
Id. at 675 n.3.
56. The dissent generally explored courts' inherent authority to protect the integrity of the
judicial process as an embodiment of the separation of powers doctrine, and then specifically established that the doctrine encompasses the trial's court inherent power to disqualify a district attorney
even beyond applicable disqualification statutes. Id. at 680-83 ("The court is, therefore it has the
We have defined the inherent powers
powers reasonably necessary to act as an efficient court ....
of the judiciary to be the powers of that logically flow from the existence of the judiciary as a the
third co-equal branch of government.") (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). It concluded that
"trial courts must remain within their constitutional authority when they disqualify a district attorney
for reasons other than those specified in section 20-1-107." Id. at 682. Finally, it asserted that the
statute's language is narrower than the court's inherent powers and thus unconstitutional. Id. at 679.
57. Id. at 679 (Bender, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
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exhaustive list infringes upon the inherent power of the court to protect
the integrity of the judicial process ...."'9
The dissent reflects the insight that district attorneys occupy the
dual roles of officers of the court and executive officers of the state, and
therefore the issue of disqualification entails a power struggle between
the state and the courts. It notes that a district attorney:
has the dual roles of executive officer of the state, and, like every
other attorney, officer of the court. Hence, although a district attorney is an elected constitutional officer whose duties are prescribed by
by the Rules of Professional
the General Assembly, she is also bound
60
Conduct and the rules of the court.
Exactly because the question of disqualification of district attorneys
entails an important battle for authority between the state and the courts,
to explore the attempt by the legislature to abrogate judiit is imperative
61
cial power.

Justice Bender further clarified his position in People ex rel.
E.L. T.62 He importantly explained that while he agreed with the majority
that the trial court's original findings were ambiguous and that E.L.T.'s
right to a fair trial was not necessarily jeopardized, disqualification was
nonetheless justified because the trial court had the inherent power to
disqualify the district attorney for reasons other than the ones enumerated
in the statute, and specifically, for reasons beyond "special circumstances
that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair
trial, 63 which were unclear in this case. 64 Irrespective of the issue of
"fair trial," Justice Bender found that
these circumstances support the trial court's decision to disqualify the
district attorney's office pursuant to its constitutional authority to
protect the integrity and appearance of integrity of the court and the
judicial process, and therefore its order to disqualify the district attorney's office does not constitute an abuse of discretion [irrespective
65
of whether the E.L.T.'s right to a fair trial was compromised].
To the extent the California and Colorado statutes purport to curtail
courts'
inherent powers to disqualify district attorneys and limit disthe
59. Id.at 680.
Id. at 683 (citation omitted).
60.
61.
Id. at 682 ("this case presents exactly the circumstances supporting disqualification pursuant to the court's inherent powers because it presents facts which lie outside the narrow limits to the
trial court's authority as defined by the disqualification statute.").
62.
People ex reL E.L.T., 139 P.3d 685 (Colo. 2006). Justice Bender reiterated his position
that the trial court has the inherent power to disqualify a district attorney outside of the grounds
specified in the statute. Id.at 688.
63.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-107(2) (West 2007); see infra Part II.
64. E.L.T., 139 P.3d at 688 (Bender, J., dissenting).
65.
Id.
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qualification to statutory grounds, the statutes are unconstitutional.66
One must wonder therefore why both state supreme courts failed to invalidate the unmistakable exclusive language in the statutes.
C. The Case Against Exercising InherentPowers to Disqualify District
Attorneys
An interplay of constitutional and political considerations explains
why the Supreme Courts of California and Colorado have not rushed to
invalidate their states' district attorney disqualification statutes. From a
constitutional perspective, when courts exercise their inherent power to
disqualify district attorneys, they simultaneously assert and assault the
separation of powers doctrine. Generally, by invalidating a statute,
courts declare that the legislature has exceeded the power granted to it by
the constitution. By invalidating a disqualification statute, however,
courts declare that the legislature has usurped judicial power found not
explicitly in the constitution but rather in courts' interpretation of it and
of constitutional law theory.67 In other words, in order to invalidate a
disqualification statute courts must invoke the separation of powers doctrine. And yet, invalidating a disqualification statute is an act of judicial
interference with important state interests entrusted in the legislature,68
which the separation of powers doctrine would discourage.
Courts thus are in a bind: invalidating a disqualification statute requires invoking the separation of powers doctrine, the very doctrine
which discourages the judiciary from intervening in legitimate interests
vested in the legislative and executive branches such as the regulation of
the Office of the District Attorney. The regulation of lawyers, let alone
the regulation of district attorneys, "strongly involves the traditional legislative concerns with the peace, safety, and welfare of citizens and can
involve matters of constitutionally legitimate concerns to the executive
66.
Indeed, in its amicus brief, the Colorado Attorney General appears to concede the point.
While paying lip service to the majority opinion, see Brief for Colorado District Attorney's Council
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 18, 21, People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007)
(Nos. 07SA82 and 07SA83) ("This Court has not defiantly resolved whether courts retain inherent
authority to disqualify district attorneys in situations that do not meet the requirements of revised
section 20-1-107 .... The state believes the majority's position is the wiser one."), the Attorney
General characterizes the difference between the majority and the dissent not in terms of whether
courts generally retain the inherent power to disqualify district attorneys independent of the disqualification statute, but rather narrowly in terms of "whether courts may disqualify district attorneys in
order to preserve the 'appearance of fairness' even where there is no potential for an unfair trial." Id.
at 20. In other words, the Attorney General implicitly acknowledges that courts have the inherent
power to disqualify district attorneys. To him, the only difference between the majority and the
dissent is whether the courts should exercise their inherent power to disqualify a district attorney in
order to preserve the "appearance of fairness," not, importantly, whether they have the power to do
so generally.
67.
More specifically, a disqualification statute violates courts' inherent powers, which is
justified in terms of the separation of powers doctrine.
68.
"In American democratic theory, popularly elected legislatures are the primary source of
lawmaking." WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 2.2.3 at 31; see also Brief for Colorado District Attorney's
Office Council, supra note 66, at 8-10.
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branch as well.",69 Thus, invalidating a disqualification statute on the
ground that it interferes with the ability of the judiciary to regulate district attorneys is somewhat compromised because the act of declaring the
statute unconstitutional interferes with the ability of the state to regulate
district attorneys.
From a political perspective, consistent with the "happy indeterminacy" approach I speculate that the California and Colorado Supreme
Courts took the encroachment of their powers to be only of academic and
theoretical nature and therefore not worthy of a fight. The courts seemed
to have determined that the actual injury to their authority, as well as the
injury to the defendants was so minimal as to not justify an explicit confrontation with the legislative branch. As we shall see, however, such a
conclusion underestimates the impact of disqualification statutes on defendants, fails to appreciate the consequences for witnesses who were
once a prosecutor's clients, and consequently their impact on the integrity of the judicial process.
D. The Casefor ExercisingInherentPower to Disqualifya DistrictAttorney Who FormerlyRepresented a Government Witness
If courts have declined to invalidate the unconstitutional component
of disqualification statutes because of a political motivation, the logic
would be disturbingly faulty. The stakes are much higher than an academic dispute over the separation of powers. Both the California and
Colorado statutes ground disqualification in unfairness to the defendant.70 Importantly, because the statutes do not consider the interests of
other parties as relevant in assessing the fairness of the trial, 71 disqualification based on the inherent power of the courts becomes the only viable
means of protecting the interests of third parties implicated in the trial,
such as witnesses.
In particular, the interests of former clients who become witnesses
for the government do not even enter the balance of considerations a
court could consider under the disqualification statutes. Consequently, a
district attorney may subpoena a former client to testify, compel him to
testify by offering immunity and then pursuant to a court order disclose
the former client's confidential information to the defendant if it constitutes exculpatory evidence without the former client's consent. 72 Because the former-client-turned-witness is not the defendant, he will not

69.
WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 30. The doctrine helps to demonstrate the unique and pervasive power of lawyers, and only lawyers (emphasis added), to regulate themselves. Id. at 29-31;
Wolfram, supra note 13, at 16-19.
See infra Part II.
70.
71.
Infra.
72.
See, e.g., People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007); Infra Part III; notes 190-193 and
accompanying text.
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be able to protect his confidentiality interest by moving to disqualify the
district attorney, his former lawyer.
The harm suffered by a former-client-turned-witness from disclosure of his confidential information may be significant. In addition,
compromising the confidentiality interests of witnesses harms an important public interest: confidentiality is the cornerstone of the attorneyclient relationship.73 It establishes trust, enables an open and complete
exchange between attorney and client essential to effective representation,74 and generally fosters public confidence in the legal profession.75
Statutes that do not even allow courts the discretion to assess the harm to
the confidentiality interests of third parties as grounds for disqualification are thus ill-advised.
Confidentiality, to be sure, is not an absolute doctrine. The state's
interest in prosecuting a criminal defendant in a particular instance may
require the disclosure of confidential information of a district attorney's
former-client-turned-witness. 76 For example, in a case in which a former-client of the district attorney is a key witness for the government,
confidential information shared by the former-client with the district
attorney constitutes exculpatory evidence, a special prosecutor cannot be
appointed and the harm suffered by the former-client-turned-witness
from the disclosure of his confidential information to the defendant is
negligible, the court may order the district attorney to reveal the confidential information to the defendant.
Such a decision to compel disclosure of confidential information,
however--especially when the confidentiality interests at stake are those
of a third party witness whose only connection to the prosecution is the
fact that he happens to be a former client of the prosecuting district attorney--cannot be a foregone conclusion. To the contrary, because of confidentiality's fundamental importance to the client-lawyer relationship,
the Rules of Professional Conduct presume to protect confidential information, not disclose it. 77 Consequently, while in some circumstances a
district attorney may be ordered by a court, as an exception, to reveal
confidential information of a former-client-turned-witness, given the
73.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 1 (2007).

74.
Id. at cmts. 2-3 (2007).
75. See generally Eli Wald, Lawyer Mobility and Legal Ethics: Resolving the Tension Between Confidentiality Requirements and Contemporary Lawyers' CareerPaths, 31 J. LEGAL PROF.
199,203-07 (2007).
76. Rule 1.6(b)(6) of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct will
allow a district attorney to reveal confidential information of a former-client-turned-witness assuming the information constitutes exculpatory evidence and the court grants an order compelling disclosure. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) (2007)
77. See. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (establishing a presumptive duty of
non-disclosure regarding all information relating to the representation), as opposed to Rule 1.6(b)(6)
(carving an exception to confidentiality based on a court order). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6).
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harm to the witness and the interest of society in protecting confidentiality, the court must have the countervailing authority to exercise its inherent power and disqualify a district attorney in instances where the harm
to the state is relatively small and the harm to the former-client-turnedwitness is great. For example, disqualification based on inherent powers
may be appropriate where the state can easily appoint another district
attorney to prosecute the defendant who has not represented any of the
key witnesses in the case against defendant.
Moreover, given the public interest in preserving confidentiality, the
court may exercise its inherent power and disqualify the district attorney
even if the former client waives his confidentiality interest. Such disqualification may be warranted in circumstances where the court believes
that the former-client-turned-witness was facing a dilemma of having to
choose between protecting his confidentiality interest and winning favor
with the district attorney, or where the court finds that that the formerclient may be colluding with the district attorney. Such collusion, for
example, may be the result of the former relationship between the witness and the district attorney.
When a district attorney once represented a government witness, a
court should be able to assess the totality of the circumstances and use its
inherent power to disqualify the district attorney if disqualification is
necessary the protect the interests of a former-client-turned-witness and
the integrity of the trial. Otherwise, the important interest of the former
client in protecting his confidentiality may be compromised, and with it,
the integrity of the fact-finding process. To be sure, consistent with the
"happy indeterminacy" approach and the framework set by Link and
Chambers courts should use their inherent power to disqualify district
attorneys sparingly. And yet disqualification statutes that usurp the inherent power of the courts and deprive courts of the authority to protect
the interests of third parties, such as former-clients-turned-witnesses, are
not only unconstitutional but also undesirable.
II. STATUTORY DISQUALIFICATION OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS

A. Statutory Disqualification
Providing an overview of disqualification statutes is difficult because the majority of states do not have disqualification statutes,78 some
state statutes do not directly state the grounds for disqualification but
rather grant the court the power to appoint a special prosecutor when,
among other reasons, the district attorney is disqualified, 79 and among
78. Suggesting perhaps that some state legislatures defer to courts regarding whether to disqualify a district attorney.
79.
For example, Nevada's statute states that: "[i]f the district attorney ... for any reason is
disqualified... the court may appoint some other person to perform the duties of the district attorney." NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 252.100.1 (West 2007); see also ALA. CODE § 12-17-186(a) (2007);
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the states with statutes clearly stating bases for disqualification the
grounds vary considerably. This section analyzes Colorado's legislation,
and uses it as a basis for comparative analysis of some other states' responses to this issue.
C.R.S. subsection 20-1-107(2) reads in relevant part:
A district attorney may only be disqualified in a particular
case at the request of the district attorney or upon a showing
that the district attorney has a personal or financial interest or
finds [sic] special circumstances that would render it unlikely
that the defendant would receive afair trial .... 80

Whether "special circumstances" include representation by a district
attorney of former-clients-turned-witnesses for the government is a question of first impression for the Colorado Supreme Court.8 ' The first two
prongs of the statute, request by the district attorney and showing of a
conflict of interest are irrelevant here. To date, the "special circumstances" prong of subsection 20-1-107(2) has mostly been invoked when
a district attorney previously represented the defendant. Subsection 1
thus explores "special circumstances" when the district attorney represented the defendant, subsection 2 examines other instances in which
"special circumstances" have been construed and subsection 3 studies
disqualification statutes in other jurisdictions.
1. "Special Circumstances" When the District Attorney Represented the Defendant: The UnfairAdvantage Standard
In People v. Chavez,82 the Colorado Supreme Court construed, for
the first time, the "special circumstances" prong of the statute when the
district attorney previously represented the defendant. 83 The court held
IOWA CODE ANN. § 331.754(2) (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.12 (West 2007); N.Y.
CouNTY LAW § 701(1) (McKinney 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 859 (West 2007) ("If the
district attorney... is disqualified, the court must appoint some attorney-at-law to perform the duties
of the district attorney on such trial.").
80. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-107(2) (West 2007) (emphasis added). The statute's
ambiguous language means either that a district attorney may be disqualified upon a showing that
the district attorney has a personal interest or a showing that the district attorney finds special circumstances; or that a district attorney may be disqualified upon a showing that the district attorney
has a personal interest or a finding by a court that there are special circumstances. As Justice Bender
explains in People ex rel. N.R., 139 P.3d 649, 675 (Colo. 2006), the latter reading, vesting authority
in the courts to find "special circumstances," is both more reasonable and compelling.
81.
One amicus brief filed in Lincoln suggests that no case decided the issue before because
"disqualification in this situation is such a leap of logic that no judge had previously granted such a
motion." Brief for Colorado District Attorney's Office Council, supra note 66, at 5. Of course, in
the alternative, this may simply be an issue of first impression.
82.
139 P.3d 649.
83.
Id. at 653. The court noted that while it never construed subsection 20-1-107(2) before, it
did explore the kinds of facts that warrant disqualification to ensure that defendant receives a fair
trial in Farina and Osborn. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. The court explained that
while the cases were decided under the appearance of impropriety standard replaced by the statute,
their precedential value stems from the analysis of facts upon which the court may conclude that the
accused will probably not receive a fair trial. Chavez, 139 P.3d at 653 n.5.
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that "where the prosecuting attorney had an attorney-client relationship
with the defendant in a case that was substantially related to the case in
which the defendant is being prosecuted, 'circumstances exist that would
render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.' ' 84 The
court noted that the advantage that such an attorney-client relationship
could give the district attorney on cross-examination of the defendant 'is
obvious,' 85 and reasoned that both passage of time between the attorneyclient relationship and the prosecution, 86 and factual distinctions between
the two cases would be relevant in assessing "special circumstances. 87
It is noteworthy that the court did not find that that any representation of the defendant warrants disqualification of the district attorney, but
rather only representation that is the same or "substantially related to the
case in which the defendant is being prosecuted" supports disqualification, subject to the passage of time consideration. 88 No doubt, any prior
representation of the defendant by the district attorney will give the government an "obvious" advantage on cross-examination of the defendant.
Yet the court reasoned that the advantage only results in unfairness to the
defendant when the prior representation is the same or "substantially
related" to the current prosecution, presumably because when the representation is "substantially related" the advantage to the government results not only from the district attorney's general familiarity with the
defendant but also from knowledge of relevant confidential information
related to the current prosecution. 9
In People v. Manzanares,90 the Colorado Supreme Court expanded
its analysis of "special circumstances" in two ways. 91 First, with regard
to the identity of individuals who could trigger disqualification, it held
that "special circumstances" may exist not only when a district attorney
previously represented the defendant, but also when other employees in
the District Attorney's Office gained confidential information about the
defendant's case. 92 Because the key issue is advantage to the government at the expense of the defendant, the court disqualified the District
84.
85.

Chavez, 139 P.3d at 653 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 20-1-107(2) (2005)).
Id. (quoting Osborn v. Dist. Court, 14th Judicial Dist., 619 P.2d 41, 45 (Colo. 1980)).

86. Id. (citing Osborn, 619 P.2d at 48) (noting that the Osborn court found that the passage of
thirteen years between representation of the defendant and prosecution supported the conclusion that
the defendant had not met his burden of proving he would not receive a fair trial).
87. Id. at 653-54 (finding that the district attorney in question had an attorney-client relationship with the defendant and that the relationship was substantially related to the instant prosecution,
the court disqualified the district attorney).
88. Id. at 653.
89. Id. at 654.
90.
139 P.3d 655 (Colo. 2006).
91.
Id. at 658-59 (remanding because the court found that "[w]e are unable to determine, on
the record before us, whether 'special circumstances' exist ... [because] the record does not disclose
whether [the district attorney's] prior representation of the defendant was 'substantially related' to
the instant prosecution." (quoting Chavez, 139 P.3d at 653)).
92.
Id. at 659. In Manzanares, a clerical employee who worked for the defense attorney who
represented the defendant later joined the district attorney's office. Id.
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Attorney's Office even when the tainted individual was not a former
defense attorney-turned-district attorney but a clerical employee: the
employee learned confidential information about the defendant while
working in private practice that would have given the district attorney an
advantage in cross-examining the defendant. Second, the court explained that an important factor in assessing "special circumstances"
when a district attorney has represented the defendant is the "possibility
that confidential
information could be used to the advantage of the gov93
ernment."
The court therefore found "special circumstances" rendering it
"unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial" when the representation of the defendant by the district attorney could give the government an unfair advantage.94 The court reasoned that the government
benefits to the extent that the trial is rendered "unlikely fair" when the
district attorney can take advantage of the former relationship to more
effectively cross-examine the defendant, and explained that such an obvious unfair advantage takes place when the former representation and
the current prosecution are "substantially related" because of the high
probability that the district
attorney would have knowledge of relevant
95
confidential information.
Earlier decisions by the court preceding the statute further clarify
the appropriate scope of "special circumstance" and "fair trial., 96 In
People ex rel. Farinathe trial court disqualified the district attorney who
thirteen years prior, while in private practice, represented the defendant
in an unrelated matter. 97 The court reversed. It found that "where the
two incidents arose from entirely unrelated transactions and are separated
by nearly thirteen years, no reasonable appearance of impropriety exists." 98 Specifically, the court found that the factual settings of the two
cases were significantly different. 99 In other words, the passage of time
93.
Id. In a third case construing the statute, People ex rel. E.L.T., 139 P.3d 685, 686 (Colo.
2006), the defendants argued that the district attorneys represented them when they were in private
practice and gained confidential attorney-client information about defendants as a result of this
representation. The court remanded because it was unable to determine the legal basis for the trial
court's disqualification of the district attorney and directed the lower court to its decision in Chavez.
Id. at 687 (citing Chavez, 139 P.3d at 655).
94. Manzanares, 139 P.3d at 659.
95. See id.
96. As the court pointed out in Chavez, 139 P.3d at 653, earlier case law construing the
amended disqualification statute is nonetheless relevant to the extent it considered what type of facts
support the conclusion that disqualification is necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a fair
trial. See also People ex rel. N.R., 139 P.3d 649, 677 (Colo. 2006).
97.
Osbom v. Dist. Court, 14th Judicial Dist., 619 P.2d 41, 47 (Colo. 1980). Osborne consolidated two cases, Osborne and Farinawhich the court considered separately because of their different facts. Id. at 44. Osborne is discussed below, infra note 148-52 and accompanying text.
98.
Id. at 47.
99. Id. ("[T]he [older] matter arose from a disturbance in a bar owned by [defendant's]
mother while the pending prosecution is in connection with an alleged burglary. Although both
incidents involved acts of violence, it can hardly be said that they are 'substantially related.' This is
particularly so in light of the fact that they are separated by nearly thirteen years.").
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and the unrelated nature of the former representation and current prosecution made it less likely that the government would benefit from the
former representation and therefore there was no unfairness to the defendant.
2. "Special Circumstances" When the District Attorney Did Not
Represent the Defendant: The Balancingof Interests Standard
In People ex rel. N.R.,' 00 the Colorado Supreme Court was called
upon for the first time to construe "special circumstances" under the statute in a case not involving a district attorney's former representation of
the defendant. The court explored the defendant's contention that the
district attorney's attempt to reap political gain from the prosecution constituted "special circumstances" which would render it unlikely he will
receive a fair trial. The court found that "even if [the district attorney]
owes his election to the Office of District Attorney in part to the efforts
of the [victim's] family, this fact [is not] likely to cause him to 'over
extend' in performing his prosecutorial function."' 0 '
The court's conclusion hinged on the facts of the case. The court
explained that the defendant must establish facts from which the court
could reasonably conclude that he would not receive a fair trial and
found that a mere assertion of political indebtedness is not sufficient to
establish special circumstances. 0 2 Rather, the defendant has to demonstrate "over extension" in order to meet the "special circumstances" burden. 0 3 In other words, the court did not rule out political indebtedness as
a relevant consideration in assessing "special circumstances" but instead
found that in this particular case the defendant did not prove that such
political indebtedness in fact caused the district attorney to over extend
himself.'0 Importantly, the dissent pointed out, however, that the trial
court specifically found that "the public would view the prosecution as a
'political payoff,' and if the district attorney continued to prosecute it
'0 5
would 'undermine the credibility of the criminal process."" 1

100.
139 P.3d at 671. A newly elected district attorney filed charges against a minor who was
involved in a car accident and left the scene after his predecessor decided not to file charges. Id. at
673. Defendant argued that the district attorney's decision was motivated by political pressure by
the victim's parents. Id. at 676. The court first explored what sort of "interest" may serve as the
basis for disqualification. Id. at 676-77. It held that the district attorney must stand to receive some
personal benefit and found that possible political capital the district attorney might gain in future
elections as the result of prosecuting the defendant is insufficient to meet the standard. Id.
101.
Id. at 678.
102.
Id. at 677-78.
103.
ld. at 678.
104.

See id.

105.
Id. at 680 n.4 (Bender, J., dissenting). The dissent did not explore political indebtedness
as an instance of "special circumstances" but instead argued that "political payoff' that would "undermine the credibility of the criminal process" triggers the courts' inherent powers. Id. at 684-85.
Justice Bender explicitly refused to limit the scope of its dissent to the construction of the "special
circumstances" grounds of disqualification pursuant to the statute exactly because he believes that
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Prior decisions of the court preceding the enactment of the statute
once again shed additional light on the construction of "special circumstances" and an "unfair" trial. In People v. C. V 106 the defendant moved
to disqualify the district attorney because the district attorney regularly
attended a church that was the scene of the alleged crime.' 0 7 Exploring
whether the defendant will be denied a fair trial, the court stated that it
looks to "whether the facts support a conclusion that the 'public would
perceive continued prosecution by the district attorney's office, under the
particular circumstances here, as improper and unjust, so as to undermine
the credibility of the criminal process in our courts.""' 10 8 Subsequently,
assessing the "particular circumstances here" the court balanced the interests of the defendant against performance of the duties of the District
Attorney's Office. 109 It considered as relevant factors the size of the community in question and the impact of disqualification on it."0 The court
also cautioned against too low a standard that would allow defendants
the "unfettered option of disqualifying a prosecutor whenever a district
attorney had knowledge of any fact surrounding the case,""' and against
"the most cynical view" approach that
would find "far too attenuated"
2
facts supportive of disqualification. "
In People v. District Court ex rel. Second Judicial District,' the
defendant argued that the district attorney who was also a mayoral candidate would reap political gain from prosecuting the defendant and
would be placed in a position of over extending in an effort to convict
and thus would unfairly try the defendant." 4 In evidence, defendant
submitted a copy of a news article which was later reprinted as a paid
advertisement by a committee to elect the district attorney. 1 5 The court
found this evidence insufficient to justify disqualification. 16 While the
court's language could be construed to refer only to the evidentiary
showing the defendant must make, it could also suggest the court's concourts have the inherent powers to disqualify district attorneys in addition to and irrespective of a
disqualification statute. Id. at 680 n.4.
106.
64 P.3d 272 (Colo. 2003) (en banc).
107.
Id. at 274 (reversing disqualification on the ground that the trial court had insufficient
evidence to reach such a conclusion).
108.
Id. at 276 (citations omitted).
109.
The court found that disqualifying a district attorney who happened to attend a facility
where a crime later took place would "greatly impair the independence of the district attorney and
could serve to prejudice the constitutional duties he or she performs." Id.
110.
"Especially in smaller communities, the defendant's argument could potentially disqualify
the district attorney in practically every prosecution." Id.
111.
Id. at 276-77.
112.
Id. at 275, 277.
113.
538 P.2d 887 (Colo. 1975) (en banc).
114. Id. at 888.
115. Id. at 889.
116. Id. ("The language of the editorial indicates only a newspaper's belief that the district
attorney is properly performing his responsibilities and duties as district attorney in the [] case.
There are no other inferences which could be drawn from this language. Clearly, it would be beyond
belief that anyone could state on the basis of this editorial that defendant [] would be subjected to an
unfair trial because of this district attorney's past, current, or future participation in the case.").
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cern with too quick a finding of "unfair trial" and "special circumstances" warranting disqualification.
Finally, in Wheeler v. District Court ex rel. Adams County,"17 defendant argued that disqualification was warranted because he testified
against the district attorney in an unrelated case.' 18 Assessing whether
the district attorney's "personal antagonism, animosity, hostility or enmity" toward defendant would deny defendant a fair trial, the court was
concerned with the performance of the duties of the District Attorney's
Office." l 9 It reasoned that the mere fact that a defendant has testified
against or made derogatory remarks about a district attorney was insufficient to "convince a sane and reasonable21 0 mind" that the attacked district
attorney would be biased or prejudiced.
Twin standards emerge from the case law determining whether
"special circumstances" exist. When the district attorney formerly represented the defendant, the "unfair advantage" standard applies and "special circumstances" exist when the former representation and the current
prosecution are "substantially related" because the district attorney likely
learned relevant confidential information and would be able to use it to
the benefit of the government while cross-examining the defendant.
Such an unfair advantage would undermine the credibility of the criminal
process in our courts.
When the district attorney did not represent the defendant, the passage of confidential information from the defendant to the district attorney is obviously not a concern and the "balancing of interests" standard
applies. The likely fairness of the trial is assessed by balancing the interests of the defendant against the performance of the duties of the District
Attorney's Office. "Special circumstances" exist when the district attorney is likely to "over extend," when the district attorney has "personal
antagonism, animosity, hostility or enmity" against the defendant, or
when the defendant can establish2 facts, such as political indebtedness,
that would render the trial unfair.' 1
3. Comparative Analysis
Before turning to the application of these standards to the first impression issue of a district attorney who represented former-clientsturned-witnesses for the government, we turn our attention to disqualification statutes and experience of other jurisdictions. For purposes of
117.
504 P.2d 1094 (Colo. 1973) (en banc).
118.
Id. at 1095.
119.
Id.
120.
Id. at 1096.
121.
In balancing the interests of the defendant against the performance of the duties of the
district attorney's office relevant considerations include the size of the legal community and the
impact of disqualification on the ability of the District Attorney's Office to perform its duties. See
People v. C.V., 64 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. 2003) (en banc).
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comparative analysis, it is helpful to draw a distinction between the three
grounds for disqualification in the Colorado statute. The first two-a
request by the district attorney and a personal or financial conflict of
interest-are narrowly and specifically defined, whereas the third
ground--"special circumstances"-is, relative to the former two grounds, open-ended.122 As we have seen, the latter covers at least disqualification of a district attorney who represented the defendant in the same or
substantially related case and opens the door for disqualification even
when the district attorney did not represent the defendant.
Most jurisdictions with a disqualification statute state only narrow
and specific grounds for disqualification, akin to Colorado's first two
grounds. Interestingly, some cover in a narrowly stated ground the situation Colorado covers in its open-ended "special circumstances" ground,
that is, representation of the defendant by the district attorney. 23 Several
jurisdictions do have open-ended standards of disqualification,
however,
24
their respective case law interpreting the standards is scant. 1
California's statute is in substance similar to Colorado's. It states in
relevant part that: "[a disqualification] motion may not be granted unless
the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it
122.
Yet not open-ended enough to include the appearance of impropriety as a ground for
disqualification. See supra notes 39-45.
123.
For example, the Alabama statute allows for disqualification when the district attorney is
"connected with the party against whom it is his duty to appear," ALA. CODE § 12-17-186(a) (2007);
the Kentucky statute states, in relevant part, that a prosecuting attorney shall disqualify himself if he
"[h]as served in private practice or government service, other than as a prosecuting attorney, as a
lawyer or rendered a legal opinion in the matter in controversy." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
15.733(2)(e) (2007); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-2603(a) (2007) (allows for disqualification
when the district attorney "acted as counsel or attorney for a party accused in relation to the matter
of which the accused stands charged, and for which he is to be tried on a criminal charge."); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 680(3) (2007) ("A district attorney shall be recused when he... [h]as
been employed or consulted in the case as attorney for the defendant before his election or appointment as district attorney.").
124.
Iowa's statute permits the appointment of a special prosecutor if the district attorney is
"disqualified because of a conflict of interest from performing duties." IOWA CODE § 331.754.2
(2006); see State v. Brandt, 253 N.W.2d 253, 262 (Iowa 1977) (the prosecutor disqualified herself
and requested the appointment of a special prosecutor). Indiana's statute allows the court to disqualifya district attorney if it finds "by clear and convincing evidence that the appointment [of a special
prosecutor] is necessary to avoid an actual conflict of interest." IND. CODE § 33-39-1-6(b)(2)(B)
(2007). Georgia's statute similarly states: "When a solicitor-general's office is disqualified from
interest or relationship to engage in the prosecution." GA. CODE ANN. § 15-18-65(a) (2007); see
also 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-9008 (2007) ("Whenever the State's attorney is... interested in
any cause or proceeding ....");MICH COMP. LAWS SERV. § 49.160(1) (2007) ("If the prosecuting
attorney ... [is] disqualified by reason of conflict of interest ....");Mo. ANN. STAT. § 56.110
(2007). Oregon's statute combines specific grounds for disqualification such as "if a district attorney ...

represented the accused in the matter to be investigated ...

or the crime charged" with an

open-ended ground "or because of any other conflict cannot ethically serve as a district attorney in a
particular case." OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8.710 (2007); see State v. Gauthier, 231 P. 141 (Or. 1924).
Virginia's statute is open-ended, allowing for disqualification if the district attorney "is so situated
with respect to such accused as to render it improper.., for him to act." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-155
(2007); see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-7-8 (2007) (applying the "improper" standard for disqualification). The Virginia Supreme Court applies the rule of ejusdem generis to the general statutory
language of "reason of a temporary nature" and holds that the term must be restricted to meanings
"analogous to 'sickness' or 'disability."' In re Morrisey, 433 S.E.2d 918, 918 (Va. 1993).
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unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.'' 125 The standard
for the interpretation of the statute was set in People v. Conner,126 in
which the California Supreme Court defined a conflict for purposes of
construing the statute as existing "whenever the circumstances of a case
evidence a reasonable possibility that the DA's office may not exercise
its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner.' ' 127 The conflict is
disabling under section 1424 when it is "'so grave as to render it unlikely
that the defendant will' 28receive fair treatment' during all portions of the
criminal proceedings."'
In People v. Eubanks,129 the California Supreme Court specified a
two-part test for determining whether recusal of a district attorney is necessary based on a conflict of interest: (1) whether there is a conflict of
interest, and (2) if so, whether the conflict is so grave or severe as to disqualify the district attorney from acting. 30 Under the second prong of
this test, the potential for prejudice to the defendant must be real, not
merely1 apparent, and must rise to the level of a likelihood of unfair13
ness.

With regard to the "unfair advantage" standard, consistent with
Colorado law, the California Supreme Court disqualified a district attor132
ney who represented a defendant in a "substantially related" case.
Regarding the "balancing of interests" standard, California case law is
instructive because California courts have interpreted the California statute, and specifically its "fair trial" element, in circumstances
where the
33
district attorney did not represent the defendant.
The first category of cases involves circumstances where the California Supreme Court was concerned with the independence of the district attorney's exercise of discretion. If a victim or another party funds
or helps fund the prosecution's case, a conflict of interest is worthy of
disqualification if the facts show that "the private financial contributions
are of a nature and magnitude likely to put the prosecutor's discretionary
decision-making within the influence or control of an interested party.' 34
125.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1424(a)(1) (2007) (emphasis added).
126.
666 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1983).
127. Id.at 9.
128.
People v. Snow, 65 P.3d 749, 773-74 (Cal. 2003).
129.
927 P.2d 310 (Cal. 1996).
130.
Id. at 318; see Snow, 65 P.3d at 773-74; Conner, 666 P.2d at 8-9; People v. Choi, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 922, 926 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
131.
Hambarian v. Superior Court, 44 P.3d 102, 114 (Cal. 2002).
132.
City of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, 135 P.3d 20 (Cal. 2006) (holding District attorney's possession of a criminal defendant's confidential attorney-client information regarding the
charged offenses is a proper basis for disqualifying the district attorney from participating in the
prosecution to ensure a fair trial).
133.
See People v. Jiang, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 184, 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
134.
See Eubanks, 927 P.2d at 322. If the prosecutor/district attorney's office requests payment from victim for costs that the office already incurred during the prosecution, disqualification
may be possible. Id.at 323. In other words, if the prosecutor solicited financial assistance, the
prosecutor's discretionary judgment may be skewed. Id. at 324 (George, C.J., concurring).
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The size of the contribution is compared to the normal level of funds
generally allotted to this or a similar prosecution. 135 In other words, the
court must determine whether the contribution was substantial compared
to the District Attorney's Office's normal budgetary allotment or resources. 136 The strength of the case against the defendant matters in assessing the importance of the financial factor. 37 In addition, the court
must determine whether the financial provider had an interest in prosecuting the specific defendant, or an interest in benefiting the general public corresponding with the interest of the prosecution. 138 That is, two
related factors are whether the financial provider is a private party 139 and
40
whether the defendant's actions directly harmed the financial provider.'
Moreover, even an institutional agreement between government agencies
may create a conflict of interest that triggers disqualification because the
arrangement would negatively affect the prosecutor's discretionary judgment.1 41 Similarly, the court held that close family relationship between
the defendant and longtime employees of a District Attorney's Office
may qualify as grounds for disqualification 42because such ties are likely to
influence the district attorney's discretion. 1
A related category deals with publicly disclosing information relevant to the case and information that may taint the public's perceptions
of defendant. For example, in People v. Choi,143 the court was concerned
that the district attorney's loss of a close friend had adversely affected his
independent judgment in such a way that defendant's right to a fair trial
135.
Id. at 323.
136.
Id. at 324 (George, C.J., concurring).
137.
"Arguably, a factually weak case is more subject than a strong case to influence by extraneous financial considerations, since in the absence of financial assistance from the victim the prosecutor is more likely to abandon or plea bargain such a case." Id. at 323.
138.
Compare Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, where the interested party that provided financial assistance was a corporation from which defendant allegedly stole trade secrets, with People v. Parmar,
where a government agency contracted with the district attorney's office to provide financial assistance in order to prosecute public nuisances generally. 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
139.
Hambarian v. Superior Court, 44 P.3d 102, 109 (Cal. 2002); Parmar,104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
42; Eubanks, 927 P.2d at 320.
140.
Parmar,104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42.
141.
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 250 (1980); Parmar, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42;
Eubanks, 927 P.2d at 320 (emphasis added) ("For example, a scheme that provides monetary rewards to a prosecutorial office might carry the potential impermissibly to skew a prosecutor's exercise of the charging and plea bargaining functions.").
142.
People v. Vasquez, 137 P.3d 199, 203 (Cal. 2006) (finding close family ties where defendant's mother worked as an administrator in the district attorney's office for about 13 years, and her
husband, defendant's stepfather had been employed for around the same amount of time as a deputy
district attorney). The fact that the prosecutor admitted fear of the appearance of favoritism towards
defendant, and that fear influenced the decision to reject defendant's request for bench trial rather
than jury trial showed the existence of a conflict of interest and its extreme gravity. Id. at 203-04.
However, compare this to People v. Petrisca, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 182, 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), where
the defendant was charged with murder and other felonies for driving at excessive speeds on the
wrong side of the road and colliding with two vehicles. The driver of one vehicle incurred fatal
injuries and was also the mother of a deputy district attorney in the office. Id. The prosecutor was
chosen for the specific reason that the deputy district attorney and the prosecutor did not have a
social relationship-disqualification was not required. Id. at 185.
143.
94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
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was endangered. 44 It found that the district attorney's disclosure of information related to the case demonstrated the adverse impact and disqualified the district attorney. 45 Finally, the court decided cases triggering disqualification based on the district attorney appearing as a witness.
For example, when a prosecutor witnesses the defendant's 46illegal actions
the conflict may be so grave as to require disqualification.
Read together, California's extensive case law construing its disqualification statute expands Colorado's "balancing of interests" standard. It clarifies that not every conflict of interest gives rise to "special
circumstances" warranting disqualification, rather, the prejudice against
defendant must be severe enough to constitute unfairness.
B. Disqualificationof a DistrictAttorney Whose Former Client is a Witness for the Government: Striking a Balance at the Point of Unfair
Advantage
First impression construction of the "special circumstances" prong
when the district attorney represented former-clients-turned-witnesses for
the government should build on and combine both the "unfair advantage"
and the "balancing of interests" standards. Reliance on the "unfair advantage" standard is warranted because representation of witnesses for
the government by the district attorney resembles representation of the
defendant in two important ways.
First, the unfair advantage to the government stems from the district
attorney's former representation of clients-turned-witnesses. "Special
circumstances" simply do not require that the former representation be of
the defendant. Indeed, in Manzanares the court recognized that people
other than the district attorney and the defendant might cause disqualification. 147
Second, the former representation gives the district attorney an "obvious" advantage over the defendant in terms of questioning the formerclient-turned-witness. An instructive case is Osborn v. District Court,
FourteenthJudicialDistrict.'48 Osborne involved a former district attorney who after participating in the prosecution of the defendant joined a
law firm that handled defendant's appeal and re-trial. 149 The court upheld the disqualification of the former district attorney. 50 It found that
the district attorney "took part in the interview of the victim, the arresting
officers, and many other important prosecution witnesses. Most impor144.

Id.

145. Id.at 927.
146.
People v. Jenan, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 771, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
147.
People v.Manzanares, 139 P.3d 655, 658-59 (Colo. 2006); supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
148.
619 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1980).
149.
Id.at 44-45.
150.
Id at 45.
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tantly, [the district attorney] had an ongoing relationship with the victim,
who was then a juvenile undergoing a number of problems which required extended supervision."1' 51 The court concluded, "[t]he advantage
that such a relationship could give a defense lawyer on crossexamination of the victim is obvious."' 5 2 That is, the court held that the
former district attorney's substantial participation in the same case and,
importantly, the nature of her relationship with the witness (the victim)
warranted her disqualification.
Yet analysis of the "unfair advantage" standard indicates that not
every advantage to the government renders the trial "likely unfair" from
the defendant's point of view. When the district attorney represented the
defendant the court determined that the former representation results in
an unfair advantage if it was the same or substantially related to the current prosecution because the relationship raised a serious concern that the
district attorney might take advantage of related confidential information
the defendant revealed.
Representation of a former-client-turned-witness differs from representation of the defendant because a key concern in the latter case is the
passing of confidential information from the defendant to the district
attorney which can give the government an unfair advantage. The advantage to the government here stems not from its access to confidential
defendant's information, but from the relationship of the district attorney
with a witness. To be sure, if the representation of the former-clientturned-witness is in the same or "substantially related" matter, the district
attorney may have learned relevant confidential information while representing the witness. Such information, however, will not yield the government an unfair advantage because the district attorney will have to
53
reveal all such exculpatory information to the defendant.
It is important to note that the primary concern with regard to the
representation of witnesses is the extent of their relationship with the
district attorney and therefore mere discovery of information the district
attorney learned about the witness is not sufficient to ensure fairness to
the defendant. First, the district attorney could have learned confidential
information about the witness that the defendant will not be entitled to
and that the witness may not be under a duty to reveal. Second, the dis151.

Id.

152.

Id.

153.
While COLO. R. PROF'L COND. R. 1.6(a) (2007) extends confidentiality to all information
related to the representation of clients, COLO. R. PROF'L COND. R. 1.9(a) (2007) prohibits an attorney from representing another person in the same or substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of a former client, COLO. R. PROF'L COND R.
1.9(c) prohibits an attorney from using or revealing confidential information of a former client, and
COLO. R. PROF'L COND R. 1.1 l(d)(1) (2007) subjects a district attorney to these provisions, nonetheless, COLO. R. PROF'L COND R. 1.6(b)(6) states that an attorney may reveal confidential information
if required by other law. As the court pointed out in Lincoln, other law requires the disclosure of
exculpatory information to the defendant. People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274, 1279-80 (Colo. 2007).
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trict attorney's relationship with the witness will give the district attorney
an advantage in examining the witness. For example, the district attorney might use information that does not meet the exculpatory threshold
but nonetheless might help in eliciting favorable testimony from the client-turned witness. Moreover, given the prior relationship
the witness
15 4
might be partial toward his lawyer-turned-district attorney.
Osborne clarifies that the court's concern is the fairness of the trial,
and that knowledge of confidential information is not the standard for
disqualification but rather an example of "special circumstances," and of
an unfair advantage warranting disqualification. 15 5 To be sure, the court
disqualified the district attorney-turned-defense attorney not because she
possessed confidential information about the witness. Rather, the court
disqualified the attorney because her former relationship with the witness
in the case gave her an unfair advantage over the state in cross56
examining the witness. 1
The issue therefore becomes how to quantify the advantage to the
government in assessing when the advantage from the former representation of former-clients-turned-witnesses compromises the fairness of the
trial. The "balancing of interests" standard is on point and the California
Supreme Court's two-step analysis requiring a conflict and then assessing its severity is helpful. The mere representation of the former-clientturned-witness satisfies the conflict requirement and yet unfairness to the
defendant is only likely when the representation meets the severity requirement.157 Balancing the interests of the defendant against the interests of the state in the performance of the duties of the District Attorney's Office and striking the balance at the point of an unfair advantage
to the government means that a district attorney should be disqualified if
she formerly represented a witness in a "substantially related" matter
because the representation would give the district attorney an advantage
over the defendant in examining the witness. Osborn is directly on point.
The court held that the former district attorney's58 substantial participation
in the same case warranted her disqualification.'
Moreover, even if the representation of the witness is not "substantially related" to the prosecution of defendant, the district attorney should
be disqualified if her relationship with the witness would give her an
unfair advantage over the defendant. The fact-specific, case-by-case
determination will depend on elements such as the importance of the
testimony (i.e., whether the former client is a key witness), the passage of
154.
The desire of a former-client-turned-witness to help his former lawyer-turned-district
attorney need not amount to committing perjury. The advantage to the government stems from the
efforts of the witness to cooperate with thee district attorney given their relationship.
155.
See Osborn v. District Court, Fourteenth Judicial Dist., 619 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1980).
156. Id. at 47.
157.
See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
158. "619 P.2d at 45.
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time, the nature of the relationship between the witness and the district
attorney, whether the relationship has concluded and the size of the
community.
This proposed standard-combining the insights of both "unfair advantage" and the "balancing of interests"-leads to the question of how
to assess factually the nature of the relationship between the district attorney and the former-client-turned-witness. Based on Brady v. Maryland,'59 in which the court held that a declaration by the district attorney
that all exculpatory information has been disclosed would suffice, and
the defendant could only challenge it with a good faith basis, a declaration by the district attorney outlining the nature of the relationship with
the former-client-turned-witness should
suffice to allow the court to as60
sess the fairness to the defendant.
In conclusion, representation of a former-client-turned-witness may
constitute "special circumstances" that would render it unlikely that the
defendant would receive a fair trial. Whether the advantage such representation gives the government over the defendant warrants disqualification depends on the facts of the representation. Balancing the interests of
protecting the defendant's rights and ensuring the fairness of the trial
against the state's interests of protecting the performance of the duties of
the District Attorney's Office the court may rely on a declaration by the
district attorney attesting to relevant facts regarding the relationship. For
example, "special circumstances" do not exist when the district attorney
briefly represented a witness ten years ago on an unrelated matter, had no
significant contact with the former client since, and where the community is small, rendering it likely that a local defense-attorney-turneddistrict attorney will have contacts with people in the community. On
the other hand, "special circumstances" do exist when the witness is
likely to play a critical role in the prosecution, the district attorney had a
longstanding relationship with the former-client-turned-witness, the relationship ended shortly before the current prosecution, or there are ongoing contacts between the former client and district attorney, for example,
due to unpaid fees.
C. "Special Circumstances" and Imputed Disqualification
Next, a court would need to consider whether disqualification of a
district attorney warrants disqualification of the entire District Attorney's
159.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
160.
Lincoln, 161 P.3d at 1281 ("A trial court can ask for and accept a prosecuting attorney's
assurance that he or she has diligently reviewed the facts and circumstances of the prior representation and there is no exculpatory information required to be revealed by the constitution, statutes, and
case law. This is so because, like all attorneys, the prosecuting attorney as an officer of the court
must not lie or misrepresent facts to the court .... In addition, as a duty of office, a prosecutor,
who wishes to continue prosecuting the case, must disclose to the court that he or she has exculpatory information and reveal that information if ordered to do so by the court.") (citations omitted).
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Office. ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Opinion 342 sets the stage for relaxed imputed disqualification of
government attorneys.' 61 The Committee held that disqualification of a
former government attorney should not usually lead to the disqualification of the governmental agency in question.162 It reasoned that the nature of the relationships between governmental attorneys, specifically the
lack of a common shared interest in financial success contrasted with
private lawyers practicing in a firm, allows for a more lax disqualification rule. 163 It concluded that a governmental agency need not be disqualified if the tainted attorney is appropriately screened.164 The Opinion
was adopted in United States v. Caggiano, 65 in which the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that "when the individual attorney is separated
from any participation on matters affecting his former client, 'vicarious
disqualification
of a government department is not necessary or
66
wise.""90

In People v. Choi the California Court of Appeals held that the "fair
trial" analysis under section 1424 is applicable to the issue of imputed
disqualification. That is, it found that in deciding whether to acknowledge a screen or disqualify an entire District Attorney Office, the court
must assess
the impact on the likelihood of the defendant receiving a fair
7
trial.

16

Colorado courts follow both Opinion 342 and Caggiano with regard
to generally allowing effective screens within governmental agencies in
lieu of disqualification of the entire department, and Choi in terms of
deciding whether to impute a conflict to the entire District Attorney's
Office or allow a screen based on an analysis of "special circumstances"
and "fair trial." In Chavez the Colorado Supreme Court held that a properly drafted screening policy is relevant to the court's assessment of
whether "special circumstances" require the disqualification of the entire
office.' 68 It found that "if the screening policy is adequate, then no disqualification [of the entire office] is necessary."' 69 If the screening policy is inadequate, no immediate disqualification follows, rather, the court
then must "determine whether confidential information from a prior rep161.
62 A.B.A. J. 517 (1976). The committee found that compelling policy considerations
justify drawing a distinction between private and governmental lawyers for purposes of disqualification and held that a special, more lax government-friendly disqualification rule should apply to the
latter attorneys. Id.at 518-20.

162.

Id.at 521.

163.

Id.

164.
Id.
165.
660 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1981).
166. Id.at 191 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof l Responsibility, Formal Op. 342
(1975)). The court sustained the disqualification of the individual defense attorney-turned district
attorney and reversed the disqualification of the entire district attorney's office.
167.
94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 926-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). The court affirmed the trial court's
disqualification of the entire office.
168.
139 P.3d 649, 654 (Colo. 2006).
169.
Id.
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resentation nevertheless has been and can continue to be adequately
screened from others actually prosecuting the case."' 170 In other words a
conflict of interest and inadequate screening are not sufficient to warrant
disqualification of the entire office. Instead, the key issue is whether
confidential information can be screened not from all attorneys in the
office but only from those actually prosecuting the defendant. In Manzanares, the court reiterated that a "properly drafted screening policy is
indeed relevant to the determination of whether disqualification is necessary to ensure the defendant receives a fair trial," 17 1 and remanded to the
trial court to determine whether in
fact confidential information has been
172
and can continue to be protected.
While a conflict of interest and an inadequate screening policy do
not automatically lead to disqualification of the entire District Attorney's
Office, a defective policy would place on the District Attorney's Office a
higher burden of proving that no confidential information and other information benefiting the government regarding the former-client-turnedwitness had been shared by the conflicted district attorney, and mere
assurances by members of the Office would not be enough.
Specifically, while a declaration made by a district attorney assuring
the court that all exculpatory information relating to a former-clientturned-witness has been revealed to the defendant or that no such exculpatory information required to be revealed exists would usually suffice
without more to avoid disqualification, 173 the Colorado Supreme Court
held in Chavez and Manzanaresthat such declaration would not be sufficient to prevent disqualification of the entire District Attorney's Office if
a conflict exists and the screening policy is inadequate. Under such circumstances, the court required "something more" than the testimony or
assertions of members of the District Attorney's Office.
We note that the testimony of members of the District Attorney's Office alone would not mitigate any "special circumstances" present in
this case.... [E]vidence of sharing of confidential information within
the District Attorney's Office, "being under the control of the prosecution,174would be well-nigh impossible for a defendant to bring
forth.'

Similarly, evidence of sharing of confidential information and other
information benefiting the government regarding the former-clientturned-witness by the conflicted district attorney would be "well-nigh

170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at654-55 (emphasis added).
Id.at659.
Id.
See supra notes 163-64.

174.

People v. Manzanares, 139 P.3d 655, 659 (Colo. 2006) (citations omitted).

2007]

DISQUALIFYING A DISTRICT ATTORNEY

impossible"
for a defendant or the former-client-turned-witness to bring
75
forth. 1

Disqualification of a district attorney due to representation of a former-client-turned-witness for the government should not normally lead
to the disqualification of the entire District Attorney's Office. Unlike
representation of the defendant, the main concern regarding a formerclient-turned-witness is not the passing of relevant confidential information but rather the advantage the government would yield from the former relationship. That advantage is the result of the relationship between
the former defense attorney-turned-district attorney and the formerclient-turned-witness. Thus effective screening of the district attorney in
question would normally address the underlying concern by eliminating
the advantage to the government while affirming the policy analysis of
Opinion 342 and Caggiano.
III. RECENT COLORADO EXPERIENCE
In two separate cases, the Mesa County District Attorney's Office
charged the defendant with criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, first degree assault and vehicular eluding. 76 Two prosecutors assigned to these cases, Richard Tuttle and Tammy Eret, previously acted
as principal shareholders
in a private law firm, Tuttle, Eret and Ruben177
stein, P.C. ("TER").

In the pending cases against defendant, the prosecution endorsed
over two hundred witnesses. 178 After learning that three of the endorsed
175.
Indeed, the trial court in Lincoln found that:
Further, even if they declare that all exculpatory has been disclosed, as they have done,
the guidelines enunciated in Chavez and Manzanares would necessitate something more
than the testimony or assertions of the members of the District Attorney's Office in order
to mitigate the "special circumstances" evidenced... The required "something more" has
not been provided here. There is no written conflict screening policy, the oral screening
policy is nebulous and therefore inadequate, and no attempt at a "Chinese wall" to screen
those with confidential information has been made.
Supplemental Clarifying Order, People v. Lincoln, Nos. 05 CR 2027, 05 CR 2093, at *6 (D. Colo.
Mar. 14, 2007) (on file with author).
176.
People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007). The first incident occurred on November
23, 2005, when defendant allegedly attempted to murder a fellow meth user. Id.at 1276. Several
days later, on December 1, 2005, defendant allegedly fired shots at two Mesa County Sheriffs
deputies as they were attempting to pull over his car after a week-long manhunt. Id. at 1276-77.
Defendant, 25, is in prison for aggravated robbery. See Nancy Loholm, Family Finds Solace in
Offering Hope, Warmth to Wayward Son, DENVER POST, Nov. 9, 2006, at B-01, available at
http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_4627495. His conviction and the pending charges all stem
from an alleged methamphetamine-fueled rampage in 2005. Id.
177. Lincoln, 161 P.3d at 1277 ("Tuttle and Eret served as district attorneys in Mesa County
until 2002 when they left to open TER. The firm closed in December 2004 and Tuttle and Eret
returned the District Attorney's Office. Dan Rubenstein also acted as a principal shareholder in TER
and returned to the Mesa County District Attorney's Office at the same time as Tuttle and Eret.
Rubenstein was not assigned to prosecute defendant's pending cases, but did act as a Chief Deputy
District Attorney in Mesa County. The record is unclear about whether Rubenstein has any role
connected with the prosecution of Lincoln's cases.").
178. Id. at 1277.
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witnesses were previously represented by TER in unrelated matters,1 79
defendant filed discovery motions seeking, inter alia, potentially exculpatory information concerning those former clients which could be used in
cross-examination to question the credibility of the clients-turned witnesses. 180 Tuttle, Eret and the District Attorney's Office objected to
these discovery motions, and in a related court hearing Mr. Tuttle represented that he did not know of any potentially exculpatory information
that needed to be disclosed.1 8' Defendant then moved to disqualify Tuttle, Eret and the District Attorney's Office pursuant to the Colorado disqualification statute and in the alternative pursuant to the court's inherent
power on the basis that the involved prosecutors were unwilling or unable to provide potentially exculpatory information about their former
clients, and because there was no way to ascertain whether
Tuttle's claim
182
of no potentially exculpatory evidence was accurate.
The trial court did not generally decide when representation of former-clients-turned-witnesses will constitute "special circumstances" and
lead to disqualification of a district attorney, but appropriately focused its
attention on the specific claims raised by defendant, namely the inability
of the prosecutors to reply to the discovery motions filed by defendant
and the inability of the court to ascertain whether the prosecutors' claims
1 83
of possessing no potentially exculpatory evidence were accurate.

179. Id. ("Sheriff's Deputy Michael Miller, a named victim in the second case, was represented
by Eret in a contested domestic relations case, which concluded in 2004. A second witness, Corey
Winkel, was represented by Eret in a 2002 felony marijuana distribution prosecution. TER was not
fully paid for its legal services and turned the debt over to a collection agency in 2003. According to
the record, the debt is still outstanding. In addition, [in 2006 Winkel was prosecuted by Tuttle, after
Tuttle returned to the District Attorney's Office for a felony accessory charge related to the first
pending case against defendant.] [A] third witness, Robert Thorpe, and several members of his
family were represented by TER on a variety of business and personal matters between 2002 and
2004. Thorpe's daughter was prosecuted by the Mesa County District Attorney's Office on an
unrelated charge in 2005 after Tuttle and Eret returned to that Office. Eret was involved in the
review, charging and oversight of the prosecution of Thorpe's daughter, but she did not personally
prosecute the case."). Thorpe and his family objected to the District Attorney's Office prosecution
of the case filing their own request for a special prosecutor, which motion was ultimately denied.
People ex rel. E.L.T., 139 P.3d 685, 685-88 (Colo. 2006).
180.
Id.
181.
Id.
182. Id. at *4; see also Mike Wiggins, Lincoln to Seek Special Prosecutor,GRAND JUNCTION
DAILY SENTINEL, Jan. 30, 2007, at B- 1. The defendant moved to disqualify the district attorneys and
the District Attorney's Office based on representation of witnesses in the case only after the goveminent moved to disqualify a defense attorney on the same ground - that he previously represented
witnesses in the case against defendant. See Mike Saccone, Motion May Delay Trial in Murder
Attempt Case, GRAND JUNCTION DAILY SENTINEL, Dec. 31, 2006, at B-8. Subsequently, Lincoln
dismissed the defense attorney in question, rendering the People's disqualification motion moot. See
Mike Saccone, Suspect Dismisses Attorney, GRAND JUNCTION DAILY SENTINEL, Jan. 6, 2007, at B1.
183.
Clarifying Order, supra note 175. The issue of first impression was not presented to the
trial court as such. Rather than explicitly asserting that the Colorado disqualification statute authorized disqualification of district attorneys who represented former-clients-turned-witnesses and, in the
alternative, that courts should exercise their inherent power to disqualify district attorney's in these
circumstances, the defendant in Lincoln narrowly argued that the district attorneys' failure or inabil-
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The trial court mistakenly held that district attorneys owe their former clients-turned-witnesses a duty of confidentiality that bars them
from revealing any information about their former clients, let alone potentially exculpatory information,' 84 that the confidentiality duty conflicts
with the district attorneys' duty to reveal exculpatory information and
concluded that the conflict results in an "irresolvable dilemma. 1 85
Moreover, the trial court held that the confidentiality duty owed to clients-turned-witnesses precludes the district attorneys from even divulging that they know of no exculpatory information related to prosecution
and consequently that there is no way to assess whether such potentially
exculpatory evidence exists.1 86 The trial court concluded that the district
attorneys' inability to reveal exculpatory evidence and the inability to
assess its existence constitute 87"special circumstances" warranting disqualification under the statute.'
Next, the trial court asserted its inherent authority to protect the integrity of the court's fact-finding process and it disqualified the district
attorneys, holding:
The court cannot countenance the withholding of potentially material
and exculpatory evidence, nor can it allow the public to have the impressions that legal ethics [rules] are enforced only when it is convenient to do so, that legal ethics [rules] do not apply to prosecutors,
can withhold or use confidential information to
or that prosecutors
88
advantage.
their
The appearance of impropriety finding was based on two related legs:
the impression of non-disclosure of exculpatory information and the impression that the rules of ethics such as confidentiality do not apply to
prosecutors.
Finally, finding that "[t]here is no written conflict screening policy,
the oral screening policy is nebulous and therefore inadequate, and no
attempt at a 'Chinese wall' to screen those with confidential information
dilemma" and
has been made," the trial court imputed an "irresolvable
89
disqualified the entire District Attorney's Office.1
The trial court's opinion established a very broad standard for disqualification of district attorneys who represented witnesses for the govity to respond to discovery requests warranted disqualification. The trial court thus appropriately
decided the narrow issue before it.
184.
Id. at *5.To be sure, district attorney's do owe their former clients a duty of confidentiality, but whether the duty bars revealing information, or in other words, whether an exception applies,
requires an analysis of COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.6(b) (2007).
185.
Id.at*5-6.
186. Id.
Id. ("Neither the People's non-disclosure nor their use of any such confidential informa187.
tion must create an advantage to the government or disadvantage to the criminal defendant.")
188. Id. at *6.
189. Id.
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ernment. What the trial court called an "irresolvable conflict" was in fact
an irrebuttable presumption: that confidentiality duties to their former
clients-turned-witnesses precluded district attorneys from disclosing possibly exculpatory information to the defendant, and therefore the defendant would be at a disadvantage and the district attorneys must be disqualified. As a result, every district attorney who represented a witness
for the government faced an irresolvable and irrefutable conflict and
would be disqualified.' 90 The opinion caused a stir. Among others, the
Attorney General filed an amicus brief in which he characterized the
broad holding of the court as intruding "unnecessarily on the authority
the people of Colorado have vested in local district attorneys through
statute and the Constitution."' 9'
The People filed an interlocutory appeal with the Colorado Supreme
Court. 192 The court reversed and remanded. 193 It correctly held that a
district attorney's disclosure requirement of exculpatory evidence pursuant to both federal constitutional law and Colorado state law trumps confidentiality duties owed by the district attorney to her former clientsturned-witnesses. 94 The conflict faced by the district attorney,
con' 95
cluded the court, "may be a dilemma, but it is not irresolvable."'
The court's decision was surprisingly narrow. Suggesting that the
only issue of contention in Lincoln was whether non-disclosure of exculpatory information gave rise to "special circumstances" under the Colorado statute, the court (correctly) held that as a matter of law exculpatory
information must be disclosed, and thus, arguably disposing of the
"only" issue before it, reversed and remanded the case with directions to
the trial court not to disqualify the district attorneys. The court, however,
ignored the important question of law raised in Lincoln: does the law
allow for disqualification of a district attorney who represented a witness
190.
This broad standard had the peculiar result of automatically disqualifying district attorneys who represented clients-turned-witness, while not automatically disqualifying district attorneys
who represented the defendant.
191.
Brief for Colorado District Attorney's Council, supra note 66, at 6; see also Mike Saccone, Attorney General to Support DA 's Appeal, GRAND JUNCTION DAILY SENTINEL, Mar. 17,
2007, at A-I.
192.
Pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-12-102(2) (West 2007) and COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-1-107(3) (West 2007).
193.
People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274, 1282 (Colo. 2007).
194.
Id. at 1279-81. The court concluded:
The accused's due process right to a fair trial and the constitution, statutory, and ethical
rules require a prosecuting attorney, if she or he wishes to remain on the case, to disclose
exculpatory information even if it was obtained from a prior representation. In this situation, a prosecuting attorney has several options. She or he may obtain consent from the
prior client waiving attorney-client confidentiality and authorizing disclosure of the exculpatory information. If consent is not obtained, she or he may (1) disqualify from
prosecuting the accused and be screened from the office's prosecution of the case or (2)
proceed with the prosecution, disclose to the court that she or he has exculpatory information, and reveal the information to the defense upon order of the Court.
Id. at 1281.
195.
Id. at 1281.
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for the government? Instead, the court merely cited its own case law
construing "special circumstances" under the Colorado statute, which
only deals with the disqualification of a district attorney who represented
the defendant and fails to explore representation of clients-turnedwitnesses. To be sure, ignoring the broader question of law was plausible based on a narrow reading of the trial court's order as disqualifying
the district attorneys pursuant to the statute solely on the ground of nondisclosure of exculpatory information. Nonetheless, the court passed on
an opportunity to decide a first impression question of law and failed to
explore the circumstances under which the Colorado statute allows for
disqualification of a district attorney who represented a witness for the
government.
Worse, the Colorado Supreme Court ignored the issue of whether
pursuant to its inherent powers a court may disqualify a district attorney
who represented a witness for the government. The court's omission was
peculiar: the defendant clearly raised the issue and sought disqualification based on the court's inherent powers in addition to invoking the disqualification statute, the trial court explicitly invoked its inherent powers
in disqualifying the district attorney, and even the Attorney General explored the issue in detail in its amicus brief. Why the court ignored an
issue clearly before it is unclear. Arguably, the court decided to avoid
the issue because in asserting exclusive authority over district attorneys
the Colorado statute is unconstitutional and deciding the issue would
have required the court to strike this element of the statute down and pick
a fight with the Colorado legislature. Moreover, deciding the issue
would have required the court to explore the traitorous grounds of courts'
inherent powers, a subject matter courts inside and outside of Colorado
have been systematically avoiding.
The court's refusal to construe the Colorado disqualification statute
and the inherent powers doctrine in the context of former representation
of former-clients-turned-witnesses not only obscured this important legal
question,' 96 but also deprived the defendant of his "day in court" with
regard to exploring the disqualification of involved district attorneys
pursuant to the Colorado statute. Finally, the court left former-clientsturned-witnesses exposed to the possibility of being forced to testify and
forced to waive confidentiality, without providing the trial court with the
opportunity to consider all the relevant circumstances and act consistent
with the interests of justice and preserving the integrity of the factfinding in the case. Deciding Lincoln consistent with the standards established above would have allowed the court to remand the case to the
trial court to determine whether the representation of former-clients
196.
For example, the court's narrow opinion in Lincoln might erroneously be construed to
mean that when a district attorney discloses exculpatory evidence no "special circumstances" exist.
As demonstrated, however, mere disclosure of exculpatory evidence does not automatically and
conclusively put to rest concerns regarding unfairness to the defendant.
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Miller, Winkel and Thorpe constituted "special circumstances" warranting the disqualification of the district attorneys involved in the case; and,
as importantly, to determine whether protecting the confidentiality interests of Miller, Winkel and Thorpe justified disqualification pursuant to
the court's inherent powers.
CONCLUSION

Courts' exercise of inherent powers and disqualification statutes are
two arenas in which the executive, legislative and judicial branches battle
over the regulation and control of the District Attorney's Office. A state
of "happy indeterminacy" with regard to the exercise of inherent powers,
and judicial deference to the other two branches with regard to the construction of disqualification statutes may-from the perspective of the
state and the courts-appropriately resolve allocating power and authority among the competing branches of government. However, in the context of disqualification of district attorneys whose former clients become
government witnesses, this state of affairs harms defendants who are
unable to disqualify district attorneys notwithstanding the possible existence of "special circumstances" that may render the trial unfair, and it
harms former clients who become government witnesses and are unable
to prevent disclosure of their confidential information.
In the context of this battle, the article advances the law of disqualification between the courts and the state. First, it explores the circumstances under which courts, in order to protect the confidentiality interests of former-clients-turned-witnesses, should exercise their inherent
power to disqualify a district attorney whose former client has become a
witness for the government even when the disqualification statute will
not allow disqualification. Second, it proposes an interpretation of "special circumstances" which appropriately strikes a balance between protecting defendants' right to a fair trial against the state's legitimate interests of effectively pursuing law and order through the Office of the District Attorney and explores the circumstances under which this standard
should result in the disqualification of the district attorney.

